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TERRORISM TRIALS & INVESTIGATIONS

Bahlul and the Power of Congress to De ne International Law
By Peter Margulies

Wednesday, July 16, 2014, 10:00 AM

In Al-Bahlul, the en banc D.C. Circuit resolved some quite important issues regarding military commissions, but declined to address other no less
important ones. Among other things, the full court opted to remand the question of Congress’s Article I power to make inchoate conspiracy an
offense triable by commission. When a three-judge panel once more takes up the Guantanamo detainee’s appeal, Judge Janice Rogers Brown’s subtle
and incisive concurring opinion—which discusses that very issue at length—should be on the front burner. Unlike the majority, Judge Brown chose
to evaluate an argument raised by al-Bahlul, regarding Congress’s Article I power to “de ne and punish… Offences against the Law of Nations.”
(Full disclosure: Judge Brown cites my paper, which informed the amicus brief Jim Schoettler and I led for national security law profs and former
of cials and military lawyers.) In evaluating al-Bahlul’s conviction for conspiracy, Judge Brown makes a cogent argument that a congressional
determination regarding an offense’s status is worthy of deference, because the Framers devised the De ne and Punish Clause to give Congress the
opportunity to “interpret and de ne international law in a more exible way that serves the country’s self-interest, but still remains compatible
with international norms.” Both domestic and international law, Judge Brown writes, support providing Congress with a measure of deference. Judge
Brown notes that one should read the De ne and Punish Clause in tandem with other provisions of the Constitution that exhibit wariness about
foreign in uence. The Foreign Gifts Clause was drafted to minimize that risk, which the Framers feared in part because of extravagant gifts to Ben
Franklin by the King of France. Hamilton, in Federalist No. 66, defended the Treaty Clause on similar grounds, arguing that the requirement of a 2/3
vote in the Senate would preclude domination by a cabal of legislators serving as “mercenary instruments of foreign corruption.” As Judge Brown
wisely observes, it would be incongruous to regard the Framers as precluding Congress from avoiding this risk of foreign in uence as it de ned
offenses against the law of nations. Congress’s role is especially important because of what Judge Brown calls the “protean quality” of international
law. In Federalist No. 37, Madison stressed the dif culty in “delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws.” That challenge is
nowhere more apparent than in international law, where some scholars sense faint glimmers of an emerging rule at breakfast and proclaim a
peremptory norm at lunch. A body like Congress, that is both deliberative and representative (or so the Framers hoped), is surely the appropriate
forum for deciding how to de ne and punish violations of international law. Congress’s status as the voice of the people situates it well to reconcile
fealty to international law norms with basic concerns of U.S. self-interest. The political branches, acting together, traditionally have been given
great deference in matters touching on foreign affairs. Courts, in contrast, are not entrusted with such constitutional responsibilities. Deference to
the legislature is the most prudent path for courts in this context.
As Judge Brown points out, Justice Story acknowledged the importance of deference to Congress in United States v. Smith (1820). Congress, Justice
Story opined, was the most appropriate branch to decide on the manner of de ning and punishing piracy on the high seas. Judge Brown echoes
Justice Story’s insight, asserting that the “range and uidity of international law, the distinctive needs of each nation-state, and dangers of faction
to a system that relies on myriad sources… of nation-state opinion and practice” counsel granting Congress a “zone of deference” in exercising its
power under the De ne and Punish Clause. Cases like United States v. Arjona (1887) likewise illustrate this tendency, as Judge Brown explains. In
Arjona, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting international counterfeiting based on the De ne and Punish Clause. No clear
international norm barred counterfeiting. However, the Court reasoned that Congress had acted because counterfeiters, like pirates, are global free
riders whose greed threatens to undermine the global public good of “wise and equitable commercial laws.” In exercising its constitutional authority
within this zone of deference, Judge Brown asserts, Congress could designate inchoate conspiracy as a charge triable in military commissions. That
charge, in al-Bahlul’s case, clearly has a nexus with acknowledged law of war offenses, such as the murder of civilians. As at least two of the
opinions in the case note, members of the military commission speci cally found that al-Bahlul played a role in events that contributed to the 9/11
attack. Moreover, al-Bahlul did so with the express purpose of murdering U.S. civilians. Evidence for that proposition included a letter by al Bahlul
that he acknowledged at trial, and FBI interviews that he never disavowed. Whatever worries some see in prosecuting inchoate conspiracy in law of
war courts, those worries are not present here. A narrower view of Congress’s power would impose what Judge Brown aptly describes as a “onesided rigidity” that ill serves the Framers’ intent. International law does not require a rigid view of Congress’s power to de ne offenses. Because
international law depends on the good will of states, the principle of complementarity affords states a measure of deference. (In cases like
Handyside v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights, no mindless acolyte of state sovereignty, calls this a “margin of appreciation.”)
Deference under international law should also extend, one can argue, to reasonable decisions by states in coping with the challenge of transnational
terrorism. As Judge Brown concedes, Congress’s power has limits under both domestic and international law. Some offenses clearly have no nexus
with international law violations. But in this 9/11-related case, conspiracy to murder civilians surely quali es. When there are colorable arguments
for Congress’s approach to military commission jurisdiction, judicial deference is the wisest course. Judge Brown’s unpacking of the rationale for
deference is sound guidance for future proceedings in this long-running case.
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